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Abstract 
The internationalization of financial markets and the increasing demand for risk 
management products have fueled the growth of derivatives markets. While most 
exchanges have experienced increasing volumes over recent years, the pace of growth 
varies widely across exchanges, and the established marketplaces face increasing 
competitive pressures. In this paper, we investigate whether the trading mechanism 
offered to derivatives investors influences growth in market volumes. In particular, 
we distinguish between manual open outcry and electronic trading. In a floor market, 
traders gather in a pit and announce their orders. They complete trades using a 
combination of hand signals and eye contact. In an electronic market, orders are 
submitted to a central order book, and trades are created according to a matching 
algorithm. Using volume data from 1990-1994 for futures and options exchanges 
worldwide, we compute growth rates for the largest contracts and find that contracts 
traded in screen-based exchanges have experienced faster growth than those traded in 
manual markets. We discuss several interpretations of the data, but conclude that 
electronic exchanges are developing a competitive advantage. 
1. Introduction 
Fueled by the internationalization of the financial community and the increasing 
demand for risk management products, markets for derivative instruments have experienced 
rapid growth in recent years. Derivatives are financial instruments whose value depends on an 
external parameter, usually called the "underlying", such as the price of a commodity (such as 
wheat or gold), the value of an index (such as the S&P 500), or the level of interest rates (such 
as the Treasury bond). The complexity of a derivative contract ranges from simple 
standardized instruments such as futures and options which are traded on formal exchanges, 
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to exotic products such as "knock-out options", "look-back options", and "inverse floaters" 
which are offered by specialized over-the-counter (OTC) dealers. 
Compared to the markets for the underlying asset (i.e., the cash or spot market), 
derivative instruments traded on exchanges allow investors to establish a position at low cost, 
and with a credit guarantee from the clearinghouse to ehminate the risk of a counterparty 
default. Investors use derivative market worldwide to adjust their exposure to asset price and 
rate fluctuations, and to maintain a desired level of risk. 
Figure 1: Using Derivatives to Hedge Exchange Rate Risks 
A U.S. organization entering a one year contract Alternatively, the U.S. firm could purchase Yen- 
to buy from a Japanese supplier 111ay want to Dollar options that would provide the right, but 
protect itself against adverse changes in currency not the obligation, to exchange dollars for yen at a 
rates by buying Japanese Yen futures contracts. fixed rate up to a set date in the future. Using an 
By doing so, the U.S. firm "locks-in" an exchange option, the U.S. firm hedges against a slide in the 
rate for Yen that will be delivered in exchange for dollar, by establishmg a "floorf' on the yen/$ rate. 
U.S. dollars at set dates in the future. The futures If the dollar appreciates, the investor shares in the 
position eliminates the risk of a slide in the Yen/$ upside by not exercising the option and instead 
exchange rate, but also takes away potential gains buying the needed yen more cheaply in the cash 
from the dollar's appreciation. market. 
Investors today have unprecedented choice and access to derivatives markets. There 
are 63 futures and options worldwide, many trading identical or closely-related instruments. 
New exchange openings hace led to growing competitive pressures between the various 
market providers. In addition, securities firms and banks compete to offer and price exotic 
products tailored to specific classes of risk in the OTC market. Exchanges, which provide 
markets for the more standardized futures and options contracts, compete aggressively with 
the OTC market and each other for trading activity and investor interest. Information 
technology, already a crucial element in streamhing paper flows and operations to handle 
today's processing volumes, is now a strategic resource used in trading to improve market 
liquidity, and attract trading volumes. 
The oldest formal futures exchange is the Chicago Board of Trade, which opened in 
1844. B e p i n g  with the telegraph, floor-based exchanges have introduced technology to 
distribute price information and enhance their markets. In 1988, the first fully electronic 
futures market, SOFFEX, was opened in Switzerland. Today, new market venues challenge the 
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established markets, and many rely on screen-based trading. In recent years, although most 
exchanges have witnessed remarkable increases in volumes, the pace of growth varies across 
exchanges. In this paper, we describe how the trading mechanism and the level of market 
automation can influence a market's attractiveness to different classes of investors, and lead to 
above average growth. In particular, we distinguish between manual open outcry, the 
environment offered by the more traditional exchanges with a long tradition of derivatives 
trading such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange or the Chicago Board of Trade, and screen- 
based trading, which appears to be preferred by new exchanges, such as SOFFEX in 
Switzerland, or DTB in Germany. 
The paper is organized as follows: in section two, we introduce the major trading 
mechanisms offered by futures and options exchanges, and discuss their potential impact on 
investors demand for trading services. In section three, we review the academic literature and 
previous research on futures market micro-structure. In section four, we present our study and 
introduce our hypotheses. In section five, we discuss our fmdings. We conclude with 
directions for further research on market structures and trading mechanisms. 
2. Organization of Derivatives Markets 
Futures and options exchanges are organized as auction markets; any investor or dealer 
can submit an order or a quote to the market. Order quantity and price are publicized or 
'exposed' to all other market participants, and the order is executed if there is an opposite side 
order similarly priced. The organizing principle in the operation of an auction market is price 
priority. That is no trades will occur at an inferior price until all orders at "better" prices are 
filled. For instance, no trades can occur at $17.49 until all orders to buy at $17.50 have 
executed. Similarly, no trades can occur at 17.52 until all orders to sell at $17.51 have been 
filled. Note that there is no guarantee that an order will cause a trade to occur: if there is no 
counterparty to take the other side of the trade at the specified price, the order must wait for a 
matching order. Auction markets are often contrasted with dealer markets, which are more 
common in securities and fixed income markets. In a dealer market, investorsf orders are 
executed immediately by a market maker's against his or her own inventory at either the price 
a dealer is wiUing to buy (bid price) or sell (ask price) a security. 
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Open outcry market structure. The traditional trading environment for futures and 
options is the open-outcry auction market: traders gather at a central location, usually a tiered 
pitl, and disclose their bids and offers to the other market participants. For example, a trader 
bidding $17.50 for 10 NYMEX September oil futures contracts would shout '50 for 10'; to sell 10 
contracts at $17.52, the trader would shout '10 at 52' (the 17 is implicit). If a trader is satisfied 
by the bid or offer announced by another trader, he/she uses eye contact and sign language to 
sign* to the other trader that he/she wants to hit the bid, or hft the offer. The trade is 
recorded by both traders involved in the transaction for subsequent reconciliation and 
settlement, and the price and quantity are reported to an exchange clerk for immediate 
dissemination to the rest of the trading community. Distinguishing characteristics of screen- 
based markets compared to open-outcry markets are: 
I. Time is used as a seconda y trading priority. Only the best bid and ask quotes are 
announced in the pit at a given time. However, chances are that more that one 
trader is offering the best price, and ties occur between the orders that compete to 
be matched with an incoming market order. In the case of open outcry, no formal 
tie-breaking rule is implemented, and traders select their counterparty essentially 
on the basis of qualitative criteriaz. There is an incentive therefore for traders with 
orders to fill to adjust their behavior, by shouting louder and repeating their 
quotes, in order to get attention and get the trade. For example, in a 49 bid-51 
offered market, traders who want to join the 49 bid do so simply by announcing 
their bid, and get the same a priori chances to get executed as any other bidding 
trader. Note that an aggressive trader could choose to bid 50, in which case some 
of the buyers at 49 might drop out. 
Locals and trade immediacy. Another characteristic of open outcry markets is the 
participation of a special class of traders, commonly known as locals. Locals are 
members of the exchange trading for their own account. They take small 
positions, either long or short, and generally unwind this position soon after for a 
small per-trade profit. Locals trade frequently, but only keep a position open for 
very short periods of time (seconds to minutes) to reduce the risk from adverse 
market moves. They play an essential role in open outcry market, as they act as 
market makers (Silber 1984). Locals are usually w f i g  to trade against customer 
market orders, thereby providing immediacy to markets in which the uneven flow 
of customer orders creates temporary imbalances. 
1 A trading pit is a concen~cally organized set of descending steps. 
2 For example, some traders have a reputation of malung fewer errors, and will be preferred for 
the quality of their trades. Other selection criteria include returning a favor, or simpIy, the proximity of 
a trader who just announced a quote. 
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Agency auction market structure. The agency auction is an alternative way to organize 
floor-based futures and options markets. In this market design, an exchange member, called a 
specialist in U.S. exchanges, is assigned an exclusive role in handling orders and executing 
trades. Investors submit their orders to the specialist who centralizes them in a limit order 
book. Order are matched manually by the specialist, assisted in some cases through an 
electronic limit order book. Matching is based on price and time priorities: the order with the 
best price will execute against a market order. If more than one order compete for execution, 
the one which was submitted first will be given priority. The objective of the specialist is to 
maximize the number of contracts traded while minimizing price fluctuations. Specialist 
smooth out temporary imbalances between buy and sell orders either by trading against their 
own inventory, or by postponing trade execution until the balance is restored. The main 
difference between this market structure and open outcry is that strict time priority is 
maintained by the specialist's limit order book. 
Electronic market structures. Because they require a physical floor and human 
intervention for a trade to occur, both the open outcry and the agency auction are considered 
manual markets. Technology and the relatively well understood auction mechanism have 
created opportunities to automate the trading process. Established exchanges are looking at 
electronic trading as a way to expand their trading services, both in time by offering 24 hour 
trading services, and geographically by allowing access to the market to remotely located 
traders$. New markets have embraced technology to offer a fully automated trading 
environment, instead of creatmg a trading floor.4 In an electronic trading system, as in the 
agency auction, investor orders are consolidated in a central h u t  order book. When a new 
order is submitted to the market, it is routed for processing to the limit order book. If there is 
in the book an order that matches the price of the incoming order, a trade is automatically 
created, and the price reported to the financial community. Otherwise, the order is entered in 
3 Examples of such after hours trading systems include GLOBEX, developed by Reuters in 
collaboration with the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the French MATIF, ACCESS of the New York 
Mercantde Exchange, and APT of the London International Financial Futures Exchange. 
4 Example of market that have been created fully automated include the German Deutsche 
Terminborse (DTB), the Spanish MEFF Renta Fija and MEFF Renta Variable, the Swiss SOFFEX, the Irish 
Futures and Options Exchange (IFOX), the New Zealand Futures and Options Exchanges, and the 
Australian SYCOM. 
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the book, and waits for a counterparty order. In most electronic markets, the full book of 
orders is visible to participants. Most floor agency auctions provide information only on the 
best bid and the best offer quote. Unlike the open outcry auction, the most common tie- 
breaking rule for screen-based systems is based on time: at equal price, the order entered first 
gets priority. 
2.2. Market Structure Comparison 
As researchers have observed, market structure directly impacts the type of trading 
services offered on the exchange, and determines the overall quality of the market, as 
measured by various indicators such as liquidity, volatility, and depth.5 Market observers have 
found that the price-time priority rule in electronic trading systems tends to suppress the 
participation of locals. Because locals' trading strategy relies on the rapid turnover of their 
position, their abhty to liquidate a position quickly is essential to their profitability (Silber 
1984). In an open outcry environment, locals can hope to turn around their inventory quickly 
using various behavioral tactics. In an electronic trading system, locals who just took a 
position must wait for all the other similarly priced orders that have been entered prior to 
theirs to be matched before they can get an execution. For example, consider a market which is 
49 bid and 50 offer. A local who is short after his/her offer was lifted at 50, generally wants to 
buy the contracts at 49 before adverse market moves wipes out potential profits. In the open 
outcry, the local can aggressively shout and muscle forward with a 49 bid to trade quickly. In 
an electronic system, he/she must enter the order to buy at 49, and wait for the competing 49 
bids in the queue to be filled before to get a trade. In terms of expected time to execution, 
everything else being equal, the local will have to wait twice as long in the electronic system 
compared to the open outcry. Therefore, locals have less incentive to participate in a electronic 
trading system. The absence of locals to act as market makers may reduce the degree of 
immediacy and liquidity of trade execution in electronic trading systems. 
During normal market conditions, the open outcry tends to supply good liquidity, as 
locals provide counterparty services for investors orders, thereby absorbing temporary order 
5 The depth of a market is measured by the quantity of a financial instrument that can be traded 
at or near the current market price. 
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imbalances. However, at times of unusual activity, the level of noise and the limited 
capitalization of locals contribute to a degradation of the market which may become less Liquid 
and more chaotic. As the level of pit activity increases, it becomes very difficult for all the 
participants to communicate and hear trading intentions, and the market tends to become 
fragmented. Submarkets develop, consistmg of physically close traders. There may be 
discrepancies between prices in the various submarkets. This situation undermines the price 
discovery process by reducing competition and isolating orders, which forces locals to further 
protect themselves against adverse price movements by widening their quotes. In addition, 
locals, who are typically individuals with small capital, cannot take large positions, which 
limits their market making potential. The combination of these factors results in lower 
liquidity and increased volatility. 
The agency auction and screen-based systems have a built in protection against 
fragmentation, as they centrake orders in a limit order book. The consolidation of orders also 
helps price discovery by providing an indication of the trading intentions of market 
participants. The disclosure of away-from-the-market orders in screen-based systems gives 
traders a sense of where the market is likely to go, a sense of its depth, as well as information 
how fast and at what price they can hope to get out of a position in case of adverse price 
changes. This information encourages the participation of dealers and investors in the market. 
The tune priority rule is an incentive for traders and investors to reveal their trading intentions 
early in order to maximize their chances of execution. This early submission increases the 
number of orders contributmg to the price discovery, thereby improving liquidity and reducing 
volatility. 
Screen-based systems alter the way traders and investors access and interact with the 
market. To disclose their trading intentions, traders in the pit announce their quotes to other 
market participants. These quotes are short lived, and understood to be good "as long as the 
breath is warm". Therefore, traders who want to withdraw their quotes simply do not repeat 
them. This is a very efficient way to adjust to fast moving markets. In an automated 
environment, traders interact with the market through computer terminals. Orders must be 
entered into the system, and any modification or cancellation of these orders involve another 
transaction by the trader. The time required to execute the transaction, e.g. the tune for 
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physical entry plus the system's response time, create a delay between the traders' formulation 
of trading intentions and the time these intentions are actually exposed to the market. During 
this delay, traders face the risk of either getting an unwanted execution or missing a trade. 
This negative factor for electronic systems might be offset by the better accessibility of 
automated markets. Terminals can be remotely located, allowing traders from different regions 
of the world to participate in the market. The flexible access structure of an automated market 
encourages traders who are active on related markets to take part in the electronic market, 
thereby increasing the overall liquidity. 
The impact of trading errors is factored into commissions and fees paid by investors, 
ultimately affects trading costs. One recurrent type of error is an out-trade. An out-trade 
results from a mismatch between the information reported by the two parties involved in a 
trade. The source of the error can be a miscommunication between buyer and seller, resulting 
in different quantities or prices recorded by the traders, an error in writing the trading ticket, or 
an error in reporting the trade. This type of problem is quite frequent in manual markets, and 
involves costly error resolution, and possibly losses from inaccurate order execution. Out- 
trades are virtually impossible in electronic systems, as trade are created by automatically 
matching buy and sell orders. The superior risk management capabilities of a screen-based 
system reduce the overall cost of trading, and should increase the willingness of traders and 
investors to participate in automated markets. 
To summarize, the open outcry market mechanism, whose lack of time priority 
encourages the participation of locals, is conducive to high immediacy, provided at the cost of 
the locals spread, and a tendency to deteriorate into submarkets under stress. The market 
structure of the agency auction and screen-based systems, which enforces the centralization of 
orders in a limit order book and a price-time priority rule, has the potential for lower trading 
costs, but also has lower immediacy, as imbalances may delay trade execution. In addition, 
screen-based trading provides improved market access, and the information processing 
capabilities of a computerized environment. 
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2.3. Market Users 
There are two general classes of derivatives participants: hedgers, who use derivatives 
to reduce market risk, and speculators, who hold derivatives to get exposure to price variations 
of the underlying at a fraction of its cost. For both classes of investors, the ability to trade 
quickly is essential: for hedgers who want to protect themselves against adverse market moves, 
delay in execution may ruin the benefit of the hedge if the market moves before they can take 
on a position. For speculators, inability to execute an order quickly might mean the loss of 
profit opportunities. Therefore, a critical attribute of a derivative market must be immediacy. 
Trading cost is less important for hedgers, as their main objective is risk protection. Cost is 
important, however, to speculators who are motivated by profit. Lower trading costs allow 
them to trade more often, and to maximize their margin on round-trip trades. The position of 
the traditional exchanges based on open outcry is that their market structure! with higher costs 
but higher immediacy than electronic systems, provides a superior trading environment. Floor 
market justify their lack of automation by screen-based systems' inherent price-time priority 
rule, which results in a lack of attractiveness to market makers, and hence, lower immediacy. 
The debate on the competitive merits of the various trading mechanisms highlights the 
controversy over which market structure provides the best trading environment, and hence, 
which is the most attractive to investors. As illustrated in this discussion, the inability of 
electronic trading systems to mimic open outcry does not necessarily mean that they cannot 
attract the dealers or locals to provide the immediacy required by participants in derivatives 
markets. In the next section, we review previous research on market structure for derivatives 
markets, and discuss their contribution to this debate. 
3. Literature Review 
The relationship between market making and immediacy was investigated by 
Grossman and Miller (1988). They used a model of market maker behavior to show that 
immediacy is a positive function of the number of market makers, and that the number of 
market markers will adjust to equate the supply and demand for immediacy. The implication 
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of their research is that market makers need to be present in electronic systems to provide 
immediacy, and will require and adequate return to maintain their presence. 
Using simulation, Domowitz (1992) studied the efficiency of the price discovery process 
in open outcry and automated environments. He concluded that the superior information 
content of the electronic limit order book leads to lower volatihty, more liquidity and more 
depth in the market. These findings are consistent with Glosten's (1994) results on the impact 
of an electronic order book on the organization of markets. His closed-form model showed that 
"the electronic exchange provides as much liquidity as possible" and does not encourage 
competition, and that all trading activity should eventually be consolidated in a unique 
electronic system. Glosten attributes the sustained coexistence of manual and electronic 
markets to the fact that manual markets must offer services that were not included in his 
analysis. 
Empirical research on the relative efficiency of open outcry and screen-based systems 
has been inconclusive. Pirrong (1994) studied the German Government Bund futures contract 
which is simultaneously being traded on the German electronic trading system Deutsche 
Terrninborse (DTB) and the open outcry of the London International Financial Futures 
Exchange (LIFFE). He found that the electronic system, DTB, offered at least similar liquidity, 
and more depth than the London market. Kofman and Moser (1995) also investigated trading 
of the German Bund futures contract on LIFFE and DTB, and found no evidence of differences 
in volatihty and liquidity. Fremault Vila and Sandmann (1995) compare liquidity and 
informational efficiency for the Nikkei Stock Average futures contract which traded on two 
manual markets with different trading mechanisms, the Singapore Monetary Exchange 
(SIMEX), based on open outcry, and the Osaka Securities Exchange (OSE), based on agency 
auction. They conclude that the open outcry market is more liquid and less volatile, and that 
trading occurs less frequently but in larger size in the agency auction market, which seems to 
indicate that the OSE is preferred for its market depth, while SIMEX is favored for its liquidity. 
They also evidence a strong bi-directional relationship between the two markets, which is 
consistent with each market occupying a market structure niche. Lohse and Parikh (1995) 
identify several shortcomings in the user interfaces provide by the major electronic trading 
mechanisms. They note that "by automating the trade process, the human element is forgone 
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... [the problem is] how to improve the human interaction in these automated trade systems." 
They argue for a electronic market design based on a closer replication of the dehing  
characteristics of a floor-based market. 
These studies show no consensus over which market structure provides the best 
trading environment. Perhaps there is not one best market, but many good market structures 
that satisfy a diverse demand for trading services. Indeed, exchanges seems to strive on a 
competitive advantage derived from their market structure. Investors with large orders 
concerned by their ability to trade with minimum market impact may prefer a deep agency 
auction based market, such a the OSE, while investors seeking low trading costs will favor a 
more liquid but thinner open outcry environment, such as the SIMEX. This assumption is also 
consistent with the evolution of order flow distribution between LIFFE and DTB for the 
German Bmd futures contract: the trading volume share of DTB grew from zero at its creation 
in 1990 to a peak of 40% in 1992, to stabilize at 35% thereafter. Some market characteristics of 
DTB, such as its better market depth, initially attracted investors away from LIFFE. After a 
period of time, this situation stabilized, and providing that investors needs do not change, 
market shares should remain constant. 
4. Market Trading Volumes 
Previous research has focused on the market characteristics implied by various trading 
mechanisms, and measured empirically by market quality proxies. In this study, we take a 
different approach and concentrate on the demand for derivatives products and trading 
volumes (a proxy for liquidity and quality). Our underlying assumption is that market quality 
and the benefits of a particular market structure are assessed rationally by market participants, 
and their decision to trade in a particular environment is a function of the quality of the trading 
services provided by the exchange. While there are a number of factors that may affect the 
demand for a particular futures contract or a particular option, we believe that changes in 
expectations and value of the underlying asset of financial futures and options is more likely 
to translate into fluctuations in overall trading volumes than into a reallocation of order flow 
across exchanges. Furthermore, competition between exchanges is not limited to cross-listings, 
but extends to entire classes of derivatives. World financial markets are highly interconnected, 
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and many of the derivatives underlying assets are strongly correlated, which creates stronger 
competition between less differentiated contracts. Therefore, investors seeking exposure to a 
specific asset usually have a choice between equivalent or related instruments. In summary, 
the market structure and the degree of automation should be important variables explaining 
the variance in volume growth, e.g. changes in market shares. 
The derivative industry has grown rapidly over the past few years. While the pace of 
growth varied across financial places, almost every futures and options exchange has 
experienced higher volume in 1994. This growth was realized through increased demand for 
existing products, and innovation. New contracts have been introduced and new exchanges 
were created to better respond to investors needs. After-hour screen-based systems have also 
contributed to better service investors by allowing 24 hour trading. 
Financial derivatives outgrew non-financial derivatives by 5 to 1 in 1994, and account 
today for 80% of the worldwide trading volume in futures and options. U.S. growth has been 
slower than in the rest of the world, which can be explained by the fact that most of the new 
trading venues and the new contracts were introduced outside the US..  Figure 1 summarizes 
the evolution of futures and options markets in the U.S. and in the rest of the world. 
Figure 1 - Futures and options worldwide - Trading volume in millions of contracts 
I 
1988 1989 1 990 1991 1992 1 993 1994 
@ U.S. &changes ~ge Non-U.S. Exchanges 
Source: Futures Industry Association 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-95-20 
Competition for Trading Volumes Page 13 
5. Results 
Most new exchanges have selected a screen-based, price and time priority market 
structure, These exchanges offer a range of new trading services, such as improved risk 
management procedures, not available in manual markets. In addition to the growth 
generated by the increased demand in derivatives products, the electronic markets should 
benefit from the migration of classes of investors who are better served in a screen-based 
environment. Therefore, we should expect trading volume in these markets to grow faster 
than in manual markets. 
If screen-based markets grow at the expense of manual markets, it is likely that agency 
auction markets will suffer the most from this competition: both are based on the same trading 
mechanism, but electronic markets offer better information access and lower trading costs. 
Therefore, in the group of rnanual markets, open outcry should grow faster than agency 
auction markets. Consequently, electronic markets should also experience faster growth rates 
than manual agency auction markets. 
The data. There were 63 futures and options exchanges in the world at the end of 1994. 
This relatively small number allowed us to consider the entire population of exchanges, which 
alleviates the statistical problems that usually arise from using sampling techniques. The data 
was provided by the Futures Industry Association. The distribution of futures and options 
contracts between market structure and location for the period 1993-94 is presented in table 1. 
These numbers vary for the 3 other periods (1990-91, 1991-92, 1992-93) due to the introduction 
of new contracts and new exchanges. 
Table 1 - Number of contracts by region and by market structure in 1994 
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For each of the 63 exchanges, we selected futures and options contracts that had a 
traded volume equal to or greater than 1 milhon contracts in 1994. If an exchange had only one 
or no contracts that traded that high, we selected the two largest contracts for that exchange, 
providing that the volume was equal to or greater than 500,000 contracts for 1994. If an 
exchange had no contract with 1994 trading volume of at least 500,000 contracts, it was not 
included in the analysis. This excluded 23 exchanges. The rationale for the elimination of 
contracts with low volumes is that they tend to exhibit very large growth rates due to the small 
number of trades used as the basis to compute the rates. An analysis of variance in growth 
rates between the contracts included and excluded from our analysis showed a variance which 
was on average 10 times larger for the contracts not included in the study. Data for the year a 
contract was introduced on an exchange is not included, as other non measurable incentives 
such as aggressive promotion, or reduction of trading fees are the norm the inaugural year of a 
contract. 
For the 150 contracts selected, we took the yearly trading volume for 1990 to 1994, and 
computed the annual growth rates. 
Manual and electronic markets. Results for volume growth of screen based and 
manual markets are presented in table 2.6 They show that electronic markets have consistently 
grown more rapidly than manual markets. The large standard deviations reflect widespread 
distribution of growth rates. 
The increase in the number of contracts traded on screen-based systems, from 9 in 1990- 
91 to 31 in 1993-94, results from the creation of new exchanges. I t  may also indicate an 
emerging competitive advantage for electronic systems, as new automated exchanges place 
growing competitive pressure on existing manual markets. When a new electronic exchange is 
introduced, a reallocation of order flow occurs as investors are initially being attracted by the 
positive features of the new market. After a few years, the winning away of volume from 
establish exchanges declines, as investors, more aware of their trading options, select the 
market that best satisfies their trading needs. The repeated introduction of new electronic 
6 Statistical sigruficance tests have no clear interpretation here, since these values are not sample 
estimates, but the true values of the population parameters. 
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exchanges, however, appears the prevent a stable distribution of volume from being 
established. 
Table 2 - Average growth rates for electronic and manuaVfloor markets 
F-tests of the difference of means for all four periods are statistically significant at the 
.O1 level. The majority of new electronic exchanges have been introduced in Europe. In table 3, 
we present the respective growth rate of electronic and manual markets for Europe only. By 
focusing on a single region, we remove the potential distortion from geographical growth 
patterns, and hence, a better picture of respective growth patterns. 
Table 3 - Average growth rate for European electronic and manual markets 
Manual 
Screen 
1990-9 1 
Std Dev 
0.4920 
0.5125 
Growth 
18.60% 
42.45% 
The numbers in this table are consistent with the general results of table 2, and provide 
stronger support that electronic markets experience faster growth rates than manual markets. 
Similar regional analysis would be meaningless for the other regions of the world, as the 
number of contracts traded on electronic exchanges is very small. 
Open outcry, agency auction and electronic markets. Results on the comparative 
growth rates between the three market mechanisms analyzed here are presented in table 4. 
They show no relationship between volume growth in open outcry and in agency auction 
markets. The growth patterns in the two structures may be due to the fact that about half of 
the contracts traded in agency auction markets are commodities futures and options. These 
contracts are less fungible, and are not exposed to the same level of competition as financial 
derivatives, and are not affected by the same economic conditions. 
#obs 
105 
9 
Manual 
Electronic 
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Growth 
32.49% 
51.30% 
1990-91 
Std Dev 
0.3208 
0.5732 
Growth 
22.66% 
52.16% 
#obs 
25 
4 
199 1-92 
Std Dev 
0.4889 
0 . 5 8 7 9  
Growth 
53.21 % 
67.30% 
#obs 
102 
13 
Growth 
29.87% 
48.62% 
1991-92 
Std Dev 
0.4031 
0.6158 
#obs 
24 
8 
Growth 
36.63% 
58.26% 
1992-93 
Std Dev 
0.4344 
0.6959 
1992-93 
Std Dev 
0.2972 
0.8153 
#obs 
11 2 
23 
#obs 
28 
15 
#obs 
119 
31 
Growth 
29.71% 
51.80% 
Growth 
41.16% 
57.52% 
1993-94 
Std Dev 
0.4376 
0.5992 
1993-94 
Std Dev 
0.3797 
0.5888 
#obs 
32 
23 
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Contracts traded in a screen-based environment exhibit greater growth rates than those 
traded in agency auction structure. However, the same qualifications must be made due to the 
large proportion of commodities contracts in the agency auction group. 
Table 4 - Average growth rate for open outcry, agency auction and electronic markets 
Overall, these results show strong support for the claim that an electronic trading 
mechanism provides exchanges with a competitive advantage. 
Open- 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigated the relationship between the trading mechanisms 
provided by futures and options exchanges and growth patterns. While market structure is 
only one of many variables that affect the demand for trading services, we believe that, due to 
the global competition and access to derivatives, market design has a significant impact on 
trading decisions and volume in different markets. 
Growth 
14.43% 
Electronic markets are characterized by a strictly maintained price-time priority rule. 
Many consider it to be a deterrent to the participation of locals. However, our results show 
that electronic markets are experiencing rapid growth. They must therefore be compensating 
for reduced locals' participation with other market enhancements to provide an attractive 
trading environment. Traditional exchanges, based on manual trading mechanisms, are now 
under competitive pressure from electronic markets, and face the obligation to diversify their 
trading services if they want to retain order flow. 
The results also show that automation currently provides an advantage in the 
competition for order flow. It is not clear whether this competitive advantage is sustainable 
1990-91 
Std Dev 
0.3793 
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#obs 
85 
Growth 
28.57% 
1991-92 
Std Dev 
0.4802 
#obs 
82 
Growth 
29.34% 
1992-93 
Std Dev 
0.36 
#obs 
91 
#obs 
97 
Growth 
32.95% 
1993-94 
Std Dev 
0.3843 
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over long periods of time, and research must focus on individual exchanges to investigate this 
issue. It is probable that electronic markets initially satisfy a demand for specific trading 
services that has been unmet by manual environments. Subsequently, electronic markets 
expand based on the type of trading needs they fulfill, and their share of order flow in 
instruments also available from other floors. While diversity seems to better serve the investor, 
the fragmentation resulting from multiple trading environments could eventually degrade 
overaU market quality. 
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